CICM — Component Introduction & Change Module

OOF® Origin Open Foundation®

Independent Methodological Authority

Architecture: SLGA™ — Software Lifecycle Governance Architecture
Parent Standard: Software Dependency Standard (SDS)
Category: Governance & Enforcement
Subcategory: Software Lifecycle Governance
Type: Core Module
Governed Space: Software Component Introduction & Change Governance
Module ID: SLGA-SDS-CICM-004
Origin ID: OOF.CM.SLGA.03.04.01
Version: 1.0
Status: Canonical · Open Standard
Effective Date: 11.10.2026
Compatibility: OOF® Methodology OS™ · Modular OOF® Architecture Ecosystem
GIE-Compatible: Yes
AI-Readable: Yes
Authority: OOF® — OriginOpen® Foundation
Protection: MIP® — Methodological Intellectual Property
Canonical Language: English (UCL™)

Canonical Definition

The Component Introduction & Change Module (CICM) governs the legitimate

introduction, inclusion, modification, update, replacement,
restriction, and removal of software dependencies within a defined
software system and its governed lifecycle context.

CICM establishes the methodological conditions under which a software

component or dependency relationship may be introduced or changed,
based on applicable authority, defined scope, established dependency
identity, origin and traceability, suitability, relevant constraints,
evidence, and the material consequences of the proposed action.

It governs the relationship between a dependency action, the actor or

mechanism performing that action, the authority under which it is
permitted, the specific component and dependency relationship
affected, the applicable conditions, the resulting software state, and
the evidence necessary to reconstruct what was authorized and what
actually occurred.

CICM distinguishes technical capability from legitimate authority, approval

of a development objective from permission for each material
dependency action, proposed dependency change from authorized
dependency change, and successful technical execution from governed
acceptance of the resulting dependency state.

It applies to dependency actions performed by human developers,

organizations, automated development tools, AI coding assistants,
autonomous software development agents, build systems, package
managers, integration processes, and other software execution
mechanisms.

Its principal output is:

Governed Component Introduction & Change State

Its foundational distinction is:

Dependency Modification Capability ≠ Dependency Modification
Authority.

Operational Role

The operational role of CICM is:

To ensure that material software dependency introductions and changes
occur only within established authority, scope, conditions, and
evidence-supported governance boundaries, while preserving the
relationship between the authorized action, its actual execution, and
the resulting dependency state.

CICM establishes the action-governance foundation of SDS.

It determines whether a proposed or executed dependency action is
legitimate within the applicable governance context.

It does not independently determine component identity, establish
complete provenance, certify suitability, guarantee security, or
govern the entire software change-management lifecycle.

It relies on competent upstream assessments and preserves the

dependency-specific action conditions necessary for downstream
governance.

Operational Question

Under whose authority, within which scope and conditions, and on the
basis of what evidence may a software dependency be introduced,
modified, updated, replaced, restricted, or removed—and how can the
actual action and resulting dependency state remain traceable to that
authority?

Position in Architecture Governance Flow

The SLGA™ governance flow is:

Software Requirements → Software Creation → Software Dependencies →

Software Configuration → Software Quality → Software Security →
Software Release → Software Deployment → Software Change Management →
Software Retirement

Cross-cutting:

Software Lifecycle Control

CICM operates within:

Software Dependency Standard (SDS)

The SDS internal governance flow is:

Component Identification → Dependency Origin & Traceability → Dependency

Suitability → Component Introduction & Change → Dependency Continuity
& Risk

CICM governs:

Component Introduction & Change

It is the fourth Core Module of SDS.

Its principal upstream inputs are:

Governed Software Component Identification State

CIM — Component Identification Module

Governed Dependency Origin & Traceability State

DOTM — Dependency Origin & Traceability Module

Governed Dependency Suitability State

DSM — Dependency Suitability Module

Its principal output is:

Governed Component Introduction & Change State

This output supports:

DCRM — Dependency Continuity & Risk Module

and competent downstream SLGA™ governance.

CICM may be invoked whenever a material dependency action is proposed,
executed, discovered, corrected, reversed, or reassessed.

Governed Space

Software Component Introduction & Change Governance

This space governs the legitimacy, scope, execution relationship, evidence,

and resulting state of material software dependency actions.

Its principal dimensions include:

Dependency action governance objects
Dependency action identification
Actor and execution mechanism identification
Authority source
Authority validity
Authority scope
Authority conditions
Dependency action permission
Component introduction
Dependency inclusion
Dependency modification
Dependency update
Dependency replacement
Dependency restriction
Dependency removal
Direct and transitive change effects
Autonomous dependency actions
Constituent action authority
Dependency change proposals
Dependency action authorization
Execution traceability
Actual-versus-authorized action comparison
Resulting dependency state
Action evidence
Authorization evidence
Action uncertainty
Authority conflicts
Unauthorized action recognition
Action correction and reversal
Change continuity
Dependency action governance states

The governed space is independent of programming language, package
manager, repository, software development methodology, or actor type.

Component Introduction & Change Governance Object

Every CICM assessment shall establish a Component Introduction & Change

Governance Object.

The object represents a proposed, authorized, executed, or discovered

dependency action.

It should identify:

Governance Object Identity: The identifiable dependency action
assessment.

Dependent Software Object: The software system affected.

Dependency Component: The component or resource affected.

Dependency Relationship: The reliance relationship being introduced or

changed.

Action Type: The intended or observed dependency action.

Actor or Mechanism: The human, organization, software tool, or autonomous

system performing the action.

Authority Reference: The claimed or established basis for the action.

Authority Scope: The permitted boundaries of the action.

Action Conditions: Applicable prerequisites and restrictions.

Upstream Governance References: Relevant component identification,

provenance, and suitability states.

Execution Evidence: Evidence of the action actually performed.

Resulting Dependency State: The resulting component and relationship

condition.

Action Uncertainty: Material unresolved action or authority
conditions.

Governance State: The recognized dependency action condition.

The governance object shall remain distinguishable from the dependency

artifact and the software change record.

Dependency Action Governance Object ≠ Dependency Artifact.

Dependency Action Identification

CICM shall identify the material dependency action under assessment.

Relevant actions may include:

Introducing a dependency
Including a component
Installing a package
Updating a version
Replacing a component
Modifying a dependency
Restricting dependency use
Removing a dependency
Reconfiguring a dependency relationship
Changing a dependency source
Changing a dependency resolution mechanism

An action shall be identified sufficiently to distinguish it from other

dependency operations.

Dependency Action Name ≠ Complete Dependency Action Identity.

Dependency Action Purpose

CICM shall establish the purpose of the proposed dependency action.

The purpose should identify:

The software requirement or operational need
The intended dependency effect
The affected software object
The relevant component
The expected resulting condition

The existence of a useful action shall not independently establish

authority to perform it.

Useful Dependency Action ≠ Authorized Dependency Action.

Actor Identification

CICM shall identify the actor or mechanism responsible for performing the

dependency action.

Relevant actors may include:

Human developers
Software maintainers
Development teams
Organizations
Automated build systems
Package managers
AI coding assistants
Autonomous development agents
Integration services
Supplier-controlled mechanisms

Actor identity shall remain distinguishable from authority.

Actor Identification ≠ Action Authorization.

Execution Mechanism Identification

CICM shall identify the mechanism through which a dependency action is
performed.

Mechanisms may include:

Manual installation
Package manager commands
Automated dependency resolution
Build scripts
Continuous integration pipelines
AI tool calls
Autonomous agent workflows
Runtime component loading
Supplier updates
Deployment automation

Technical execution mechanisms shall not independently establish legitimate

authority.

Execution Mechanism Capability ≠ Governance Permission.

Dependency Action Authority

CICM shall establish the applicable authority basis for a material

dependency action.

Authority may arise through:

Organizational delegation
Defined software governance responsibilities
Approved development scope
Authorized maintenance responsibilities
Established operational permissions
Competent lifecycle governance decisions

Authority shall be evaluated relative to the particular action, software

object, scope, and conditions.

General Development Authority ≠ Unlimited Dependency Action Authority.

Authority Source Identification

CICM shall identify the source from which the claimed dependency action

authority originates.

Relevant sources may include:

Organizational authority structures
Delegated responsibilities
Approved development instructions
Authorized change decisions
Established operational policies
Competent software governance determinations

A recorded instruction shall not automatically be considered a valid

authority source.

Recorded Instruction ≠ Legitimate Authority.

Authority Validity

CICM shall assess whether the claimed authority remains applicable to the

proposed dependency action.

Relevant considerations may include:

Authority origin
Current validity
Delegation conditions
Action type
Software scope
Temporal limits
Applicable restrictions
Revocation or supersession

A previously valid authority may no longer apply.

Historical Authorization ≠ Current Authorization.

Authority Scope

CICM shall establish the boundaries within which a dependency action
may be performed.

Scope may concern:

Software project
Software subsystem
Dependency category
Component identity
Component version
Development environment
Production environment
Action type
Permitted technical operations

An actor may be authorized to modify one dependency without being
authorized to introduce unrelated dependencies.

Authority for One Dependency ≠ Authority for Every Dependency.

Authority Conditions

CICM shall preserve conditions attached to dependency action
authority.

Conditions may include:

Required upstream assessments
Defined component versions
Restricted repositories
Approved dependency categories
Required testing
Review requirements
Evidence preservation
Environmental restrictions
Additional approval thresholds

Authority shall not be treated as unconditional where material
conditions apply.

Conditional Authority ≠ Unrestricted Authority.

Constituent Action Authority

CICM shall distinguish authority for an overall development objective from

authority for the individual dependency actions used to achieve it.

A software development task may involve:

Searching for components
Downloading packages
Accessing repositories
Executing installation commands
Modifying build files
Changing dependency versions
Introducing external services
Removing existing components

Each material constituent action may require a distinct authority
determination.

Task Authority ≠ Constituent Action Authority.

Component Introduction

CICM shall govern the introduction of a previously absent dependency into

the relevant software context.

Introduction assessment should consider:

Component identity
Origin and traceability
Suitability
Introduction purpose
Applicable authority
Action scope
Material constraints
Expected resulting dependency state

A dependency shall not be treated as legitimately introduced solely because

it has been installed.

Successful Component Installation ≠ Governed Component Introduction.

Dependency Inclusion

CICM shall govern the inclusion of software components within a
software artifact or dependent software environment.

Inclusion may occur through:

Package installation
Source embedding
Static linking
Dynamic linking
Service integration
Generated code incorporation
Build artifact composition

Inclusion shall remain distinguishable from component identification and

from authority to include it.

Component Inclusion ≠ Authorized Component Inclusion.

Dependency Modification

CICM shall govern material modification of an existing dependency.

Modification may include:

Source changes
Local patches
Configuration-related dependency changes
Interface modifications
Component rebuilding
Customized distributions
Altered dependency relationships

Modification authority shall be established for the relevant component and

action scope.

Ability to Modify a Dependency ≠ Authority to Modify It.

Dependency Update

CICM shall govern material dependency updates.

An update may change:

Component version
Functional behavior
Interfaces
Runtime requirements
Transitive dependencies
Distribution origin
Resource requirements
Compatibility conditions

An update shall not automatically be considered authorized merely because

it is available or recommended by a tool.

Available Dependency Update ≠ Authorized Dependency Update.

Dependency Replacement

CICM shall govern replacement of an existing dependency with another

component or service.

Replacement assessment should identify:

Existing dependency
Proposed replacement
Replacement purpose
Relevant suitability conditions
Applicable authority
Affected dependency relationships
Material transition conditions
Expected resulting state

Functional similarity shall not independently establish legitimate

replacement.

Functional Similarity ≠ Governed Dependency Equivalence.

Dependency Restriction

CICM shall govern actions that restrict the use or scope of a
dependency.

Restrictions may concern:

Permitted software environments
Component versions
Runtime functions
Interface access
Distribution channels
Dependency categories
Operational conditions

Restriction shall remain traceable to applicable authority and scope.

Technical Restriction Capability ≠ Legitimate Restriction Authority.

Dependency Removal

CICM shall govern material dependency removal.

Removal assessment should consider:

The dependency relationship being removed
The affected software object
Relevant direct and transitive relationships
Remaining embedded or runtime components
Replacement conditions
Applicable authority
Resulting dependency state

Removal from a manifest shall not automatically establish complete

dependency elimination.

Manifest Removal ≠ Dependency Elimination.

Direct Dependency Change Effects

CICM shall identify material direct effects of dependency actions.

Effects may include:

Changed component versions
New interfaces
Removed functionality
Modified build requirements
Changed runtime conditions
Altered configuration references

Direct effects shall be sufficiently identified for competent downstream

governance.

Successful Direct Change ≠ Complete Change Impact Recognition.

Transitive Dependency Change Effects

CICM shall recognize material changes introduced indirectly through
dependency actions.

An update to one package may alter multiple transitive dependencies.

CICM shall preserve the relationship between the initiating action and

materially affected indirect components.

Direct Update Authorization ≠ Automatic Authorization of Every Transitive

Change.

Where applicable authority explicitly covers bounded transitive
changes, those conditions shall be preserved.

Dependency Change Scope

CICM shall establish the scope of a proposed dependency change.

Scope should identify:

Affected software objects
Target components
Permitted versions
Relevant environments
Authorized operations
Material dependency relationships
Expected resulting conditions

An action exceeding the established scope shall not be treated as

authorized merely because it serves the same development objective.

Shared Development Objective ≠ Shared Change Authority.

Dependency Change Proposal

CICM shall distinguish a proposed dependency action from an authorized

action.

A proposal should identify:

Proposed action
Purpose
Affected components
Relevant upstream governance references
Expected effects
Material constraints
Required authority
Supporting evidence

A proposal shall remain a proposal until the applicable authorization

conditions are satisfied.

Proposed Dependency Change ≠ Authorized Dependency Change.

Dependency Action Authorization

CICM shall determine whether the proposed dependency action falls
within established authority, scope, and conditions.

Authorization assessment should consider:

Actor or mechanism
Authority source
Authority validity
Action type
Affected dependency
Software scope
Upstream governance states
Material restrictions
Required evidence
Applicable decision conditions

Authorization shall remain limited to the action and context assessed.

Authorized Dependency Action ≠ Unlimited Future Dependency Authority.

Authorization Evidence

CICM shall preserve evidence supporting dependency action
authorization.

Evidence may include:

Approved change records
Delegation references
Competent governance decisions
Authorized development instructions
Defined operational permissions
Applicable policy records
Approval conditions

The existence of an approval record shall not independently establish
that the actual action complied with it.

Authorization Record ≠ Authorized Execution.

Pre-Execution Governance Conditions

CICM shall identify material conditions that must be satisfied before
a dependency action is executed.

Conditions may include:

Sufficient component identification
Relevant provenance assessment
Suitability determination
Authority validation
Change scope definition
Required testing
Evidence requirements
Competent escalation

Unresolved material conditions shall remain explicit.

Technical Readiness ≠ Governance Readiness.

Dependency Action Execution

CICM shall preserve the relationship between an authorized dependency

action and its actual execution.

Execution evidence should identify:

Action performed
Actor or mechanism
Affected component
Relevant software object
Execution context
Material parameters
Resulting technical changes
Relevant execution evidence

An executed action shall not be presumed authorized.

Executed Dependency Action ≠ Authorized Dependency Action.

Authorized-versus-Actual Action Comparison

CICM shall assess whether the actual dependency action corresponds to the

authorized action.

Relevant comparisons may include:

Authorized component versus actual component
Authorized version versus installed version
Authorized repository versus retrieval source
Authorized environment versus affected environment
Authorized action type versus executed action
Authorized scope versus actual effects

Material deviations shall remain explicit.

Authorized Intent ≠ Actual Execution Conformity.

Resulting Dependency State

CICM shall identify the resulting dependency condition after a material

action.

The resulting state may include:

Newly introduced dependency
Updated dependency
Modified dependency
Replaced dependency
Restricted dependency
Removed dependency
Partially executed change
Failed change
Unresolved change effects

The resulting technical state shall remain distinguishable from its

governance acceptance.

Resulting Technical State ≠ Governed Dependency Change State.

Dependency Change Evidence

CICM shall preserve evidence supporting material dependency action
claims.

Evidence may include:

Change requests
Authorization records
Package manager logs
Repository commits
Build records
Artifact differences
Agent tool-call records
Runtime observations
Dependency inventory changes
Relevant test results

Evidence shall remain associated with the specific action or claim it

supports.

Change Record Presence ≠ Complete Dependency Action Traceability.

Change Evidence Competence

CICM shall assess whether available evidence is competent to support
the claimed action, authority, or result.

For example:

An approval record may support an authorization decision.

A package manager log may support an installation event.

A repository commit may support a recorded source change.

A runtime observation may support actual component use.

These records establish different facts.

Evidence of Execution ≠ Evidence of Authorization.

Change Evidence Integrity

CICM shall preserve the integrity of material dependency action
evidence.

Relevant considerations may include:

Evidence source
Content integrity
Temporal relevance
Actor correspondence
Component correspondence
Action correspondence
Preservation history
Material contradictions

Evidence integrity does not independently establish action legitimacy.

Intact Execution Evidence ≠ Legitimate Execution.

Autonomous Dependency Action Governance

CICM shall govern material dependency actions performed by autonomous

software development systems.

An autonomous agent may:

Discover packages
Download components
Install libraries
Modify dependency manifests
Execute build commands
Update packages
Replace components
Remove dependencies
Introduce service integrations

The agent's technical capability shall not independently establish

authority for these actions.

Autonomous Execution Capability ≠ Autonomous Execution Authority.

Autonomous Tool-Path Authority

CICM shall preserve the distinction between authority for an autonomous

development objective and authority for the tool path used to achieve
it.

A relevant path may be:

Development Objective → Authority → Tool Selection → Package Retrieval →

Installation → Software Modification → Resulting Dependency State

Each material constituent action shall remain subject to applicable

authority conditions.

An authorized objective shall not automatically legitimize every tool call,

retrieval source, or software modification.

Task Authority ≠ Constituent Action Authority.

Authorized Objective ≠ Authorized Tool Path.

Automated Dependency Updates

CICM shall govern material dependency updates performed through
automated mechanisms.

Relevant mechanisms may include:

Automated package updates
Dependency update bots
Continuous integration workflows
Scheduled maintenance processes
Autonomous software maintenance agents

Automation shall operate within defined authority, scope, and
conditions.

An automated update process shall not independently expand its own

authority.

Automated Update Configuration ≠ Unlimited Update Authorization.

Dependency Action Delegation

CICM shall preserve material delegation relationships affecting dependency

actions.

Delegation may concern:

Human maintainers
Development teams
Software services
Automated tools
AI agents
Autonomous maintenance systems

Delegated authority shall remain bounded by its source, scope, and

A delegated actor shall not be presumed entitled to further delegate

authority.

Delegated Execution Responsibility ≠ Unlimited Delegation Authority.

Unauthorized Dependency Action

An Unauthorized Dependency Action exists where a material dependency
action occurs without sufficiently established applicable authority.

Examples may include:

Installing an unapproved external library
Updating a dependency outside permitted scope
Replacing a component without required authorization
Introducing an external service through an autonomous tool call
Removing a critical dependency without competent approval

CICM shall preserve the action, evidence, and authority gap.

Unauthorized action recognition does not independently establish
malicious intent or legal liability.

Unauthorized Dependency Action ≠ Proven Malicious Action.

Authority Uncertainty

Authority uncertainty may arise where:

The authority source is unclear
Delegation conditions are incomplete
Scope is ambiguous
Approval validity is uncertain
An autonomous agent exceeds an unclear permission boundary
A material transitive change is not explicitly covered

CICM shall preserve material uncertainty.

Unresolved Authority ≠ Established Authorization.

Authority Conflict

An authority conflict exists where material authority claims or
conditions are incompatible.

Examples may include:

Conflicting approval instructions
Incompatible delegation scopes
Contradictory organizational policies
Disagreement between development and operational authority
Conflicting permissions for autonomous agents

CICM shall preserve the conflict and support competent escalation.

Conflicting Authority Claims ≠ Permission to Select the Most Convenient

Dependency Action Gap

A Dependency Action Gap exists where material action-governance
information is missing.

Examples may include:

Missing authority evidence
Unknown actor
Incomplete execution record
Unclear affected component
Unresolved action scope
Missing resulting-state evidence
Untraceable autonomous tool actions

CICM shall identify the gap and its material significance.

Action Evidence Gap ≠ Proven Unauthorized Action.

Critical Dependency Action Gap

A Critical Dependency Action Gap exists where missing action or
authority evidence prevents competent governance of a materially
consequential dependency change.

Examples may include:

An unidentified actor replacing a critical dependency
An autonomous agent introducing an external component without
A production dependency update with unresolved scope
A critical component removal without sufficient resulting-state

reconstructable authorization. evidence.

CICM shall preserve the critical gap for competent assessment.

It does not independently determine software suspension, security
compromise, or legal liability.

Critical Action Gap ≠ Automatic Security Incident.

Dependency Action Correction

CICM shall support governance of corrections to material dependency
actions.

Corrections may include:

Reversing an unauthorized update
Restoring an earlier dependency version
Replacing an incorrectly introduced component
Correcting an incomplete dependency removal
Restricting an improperly introduced service integration

Corrective actions shall themselves remain subject to applicable
authority.

Corrective Intent ≠ Corrective Action Authority.

Dependency Action Reversal

CICM shall govern reversal of material dependency actions where
applicable.

Reversal assessment should consider:

Original action
Resulting dependency state
Reversal authority
Technical feasibility
Affected dependency relationships
Material side effects
Evidence of actual reversal

A reversal command shall not automatically establish restoration of the

prior dependency state.

Rollback Execution ≠ Verified State Restoration.

Dependency Change Continuity

CICM shall preserve material relationships between successive dependency

actions.

Continuity may involve:

Initial introduction
Version updates
Local modifications
Supplier changes
Component replacement
Restrictions
Removal
Reintroduction

Historical dependency actions shall remain reconstructable where
material.

Current Dependency State ≠ Complete Dependency Change History.

Dependency Action Governance States

CICM shall support identifiable governance states.

Possible states include:

Proposed: A dependency action has been requested or identified.

Under Assessment: Authority and action conditions are being evaluated.

Authorized: The action is permitted within defined scope and
conditions.

Conditionally Authorized: Permission depends on explicit conditions.

Authority-Unresolved: Applicable authority is insufficiently
established.

Scope-Unresolved: Material action boundaries remain unclear.

Evidence-Limited: Available evidence is insufficient for the required
determination.

Execution-Pending: An authorized action has not yet been executed.

Executed: The action has technically occurred, without implying

governance conformity.

Execution-Conformant: The actual action sufficiently corresponds to its

Execution-Deviated: Material execution conditions differ from the

authorized action.

Unauthorized: The action has been determined to lack applicable
authority.

Conflicted: Material authority or action evidence is contradictory.

Correction-Required: Competent governance has established a need for

corrective action.

Reversed: A material action has been reversed within the assessed
scope.

Superseded: A later governance state has replaced the earlier state.

Unresolved: Available information does not support a sufficiently
determined state.

These states shall not independently establish software quality, security,

or operational continuity.

Dependency Action Authorized ≠ Software Product Accepted.

Governed Component Introduction & Change State

The principal output of CICM is:

Governed Component Introduction & Change State

The state shall preserve sufficient information to identify:

Action Governance Object: The dependency action assessment.

Dependent Software Object: The software system affected.

Dependency Component: The component involved.

Dependency Relationship: The material reliance relationship.

Action Type: The introduction or change operation.

Action Purpose: The intended reason for the action.

Actor or Mechanism: The entity or system performing the action.

Authority Source: The applicable authority basis.

Authority Validity: The recognized validity of the authority.

Authority Scope: The permitted action boundaries.

Authority Conditions: Applicable restrictions and prerequisites.

Constituent Action Authority: Relevant action-level permissions.

Upstream Governance References: CIM, DOTM, and DSM information.

Proposed Action: The intended dependency operation.

Authorized Action: The action permitted by competent authority.

Executed Action: The action actually performed.

Execution Context: The relevant environment and mechanism.

Actual-versus-Authorized Comparison: The relationship between permission

and execution.

Resulting Dependency State: The observed technical outcome.

Action Evidence: Evidence supporting the action.

Authorization Evidence: Evidence supporting the authority
determination.

Evidence Competence: The suitability of evidence for the assessed
claims.

Evidence Integrity: The condition of supporting evidence.

Authority Uncertainty: Material unresolved authority conditions.

Authority Conflicts: Contradictory authority evidence.

Action Gaps: Missing material action information.

Critical Action Gaps: Material gaps requiring competent attention.

Unauthorized Action Recognition: Relevant authority failures.

Correction or Reversal: Applicable corrective action references.

Change Continuity: Preservation of material action history.

Action Governance State: The recognized action condition.

Downstream References: Information required by competent SDS and SLGA™

The state shall not independently establish dependency security, product

quality, operational continuity, or legal liability.

Minimum Implementation Framework

A conforming implementation of CICM must provide the following six
functional capabilities.

Dependency Action Object, Purpose, and Scope Governance

Capability to establish dependency action governance objects, identify

affected components and software systems, classify proposed actions,
define action purpose, and establish material action scope.

The implementation must distinguish proposed dependency actions from
authorized actions.

Actor, Authority, Delegation, and Constituent Action Governance

Capability to identify actors and execution mechanisms, establish authority

sources, validate authority scope and conditions, recognize delegation
limits, and assess material constituent actions.

The implementation must not infer unlimited dependency authority from
general development responsibility or technical execution capability.

Component Introduction, Modification, Update, Replacement,
Restriction,

and Removal Governance

Capability to govern material dependency action types and identify their

direct and transitive effects.

The implementation must distinguish action authorization from actual
technical execution.

Authorization, Execution, Evidence, and Resulting-State
Governance

Capability to preserve authorization evidence, execution evidence,

actual-versus-authorized comparisons, and resulting dependency states.

The implementation must identify material deviations and prevent
successful execution from substituting for governance conformity.

Authority Gap, Conflict, Unauthorized Action, Correction, and
Continuity

Capability to identify authority uncertainty, scope conflicts, unauthorized

actions, material action gaps, corrective requirements, reversals, and
dependency change continuity.

The implementation must preserve historical action records and support
competent escalation.

Governed Component Introduction & Change State and SDS Handoff
Governance

Capability to produce a Governed Component Introduction & Change State with

sufficient actor, authority, scope, action, execution, evidence,
uncertainty, and continuity information for competent downstream SDS
governance.

The implementation must not convert authorized dependency action into
software product acceptance.

GIE™ Compatibility

CICM is compatible with GIE™ as a downstream methodological analysis
and execution layer.

GIE™ may support:

Dependency action discovery
Action classification
Actor and mechanism identification
Authority source mapping
Authority scope analysis
Delegation condition analysis
Constituent action recognition
Dependency introduction assessment
Dependency update assessment
Dependency replacement assessment
Dependency restriction and removal assessment
Direct and transitive change-effect mapping
Action proposal evaluation
Authorization condition verification support
Autonomous tool-path traceability
Automated update governance analysis
Execution evidence association
Authorized-versus-actual comparison
Resulting-state analysis
Authority uncertainty detection
Authority conflict detection
Unauthorized action identification support
Critical action gap detection
Correction and reversal traceability
Dependency change continuity assessment
Governed action state representation

GIE™ may identify candidate authority gaps or propose
action-governance determinations.

Such outputs shall remain distinguishable from competent authority

decisions.

GIE™ must not create authority from technical capability, invent
approvals, infer permission from successful execution, or treat
autonomous agent task authorization as unlimited authority for
constituent dependency actions.

OOF® logic adapts to the governed reality. The engine adapts to OOF®

Governance Logic

The canonical CICM governance logic is:

Receive Governed Software Component Identification State

↓

Receive Governed Dependency Origin & Traceability State

↓

Receive Governed Dependency Suitability State

↓

Identify Component Introduction & Change Governance Object

↓

Identify Dependent Software Object

↓

Identify Dependency Component and Relationship

↓

Identify Proposed or Observed Dependency Action

↓

Establish Dependency Action Purpose

↓

Identify Actor or Execution Mechanism

↓

Identify Authority Source

↓

Assess Authority Validity

↓

Establish Authority Scope

↓

Identify Authority Conditions

↓

Assess Constituent Action Authority

↓

Identify Direct and Transitive Change Effects

↓

Assess Applicable Upstream Governance Conditions

↓

Identify Required Pre-Execution Conditions

↓

Determine Dependency Action Authorization State

↓

Preserve Authorization Evidence

↓

Identify Actual Dependency Action Execution

↓

Preserve Execution Evidence

↓

Compare Authorized and Actual Actions

↓

Identify Resulting Dependency State

↓

Assess Evidence Competence and Integrity

↓

Identify Authority Uncertainty

↓

Identify Authority Conflicts

↓

Identify Action Gaps and Critical Gaps

↓

Identify Unauthorized or Deviated Actions

↓

Identify Required Correction or Reversal

↓

Determine Dependency Action Governance State

↓

Establish Governed Component Introduction & Change State

↓

Preserve Dependency Change Continuity

↓

Handoff to DCRM and Competent SLGA™ Governance

↓

Reassess When Material Dependency Action Conditions Change

The principal output is:

Governed Component Introduction & Change State

Governance Outputs

CICM may produce:

Component Introduction & Change Governance Object

Dependency Action Identification Record

Dependency Action Purpose Record

Actor Identification Record

Execution Mechanism Record

Dependency Action Authority Record

Authority Source Reference

Authority Validity Assessment

Authority Scope Record

Authority Conditions Record

Constituent Action Authority Assessment

Component Introduction Record

Dependency Inclusion Record

Dependency Modification Record

Dependency Update Record

Dependency Replacement Record

Dependency Restriction Record

Dependency Removal Record

Direct Dependency Change Effects Record

Transitive Dependency Change Effects Record

Dependency Change Scope Record

Dependency Change Proposal

Dependency Action Authorization Record

Authorization Evidence Record

Pre-Execution Governance Conditions Record

Dependency Action Execution Record

Authorized-versus-Actual Action Comparison

Resulting Dependency State Record

Dependency Change Evidence Record

Change Evidence Competence Assessment

Change Evidence Integrity Assessment

Autonomous Dependency Action Record

Autonomous Tool-Path Authority Record

Automated Dependency Update Governance Record

Dependency Action Delegation Record

Unauthorized Dependency Action Record

Authority Uncertainty State

Authority Conflict Record

Dependency Action Gap

Critical Dependency Action Gap

Dependency Action Correction Record

Dependency Action Reversal Record

Dependency Change Continuity Record

Dependency Action Governance State

SDS Dependency Action Handoff Record

The principal output is:

Governed Component Introduction & Change State

Critical Distinctions

CICM preserves the following distinctions:

Dependency Modification Capability ≠ Dependency Modification Authority

Dependency Action Governance Object ≠ Dependency Artifact

Dependency Action Name ≠ Complete Dependency Action Identity

Useful Dependency Action ≠ Authorized Dependency Action

Actor Identification ≠ Action Authorization

Execution Mechanism Capability ≠ Governance Permission

General Development Authority ≠ Unlimited Dependency Action Authority

Recorded Instruction ≠ Legitimate Authority

Historical Authorization ≠ Current Authorization

Authority for One Dependency ≠ Authority for Every Dependency

Conditional Authority ≠ Unrestricted Authority

Task Authority ≠ Constituent Action Authority

Successful Component Installation ≠ Governed Component Introduction

Component Inclusion ≠ Authorized Component Inclusion

Ability to Modify a Dependency ≠ Authority to Modify It

Available Dependency Update ≠ Authorized Dependency Update

Functional Similarity ≠ Governed Dependency Equivalence

Technical Restriction Capability ≠ Legitimate Restriction Authority

Manifest Removal ≠ Dependency Elimination

Successful Direct Change ≠ Complete Change Impact Recognition

Direct Update Authorization ≠ Automatic Authorization of Every Transitive

Shared Development Objective ≠ Shared Change Authority

Proposed Dependency Change ≠ Authorized Dependency Change

Authorized Dependency Action ≠ Unlimited Future Dependency Authority

Authorization Record ≠ Authorized Execution

Technical Readiness ≠ Governance Readiness

Executed Dependency Action ≠ Authorized Dependency Action

Authorized Intent ≠ Actual Execution Conformity

Resulting Technical State ≠ Governed Dependency Change State

Change Record Presence ≠ Complete Dependency Action Traceability

Evidence of Execution ≠ Evidence of Authorization

Intact Execution Evidence ≠ Legitimate Execution

Autonomous Execution Capability ≠ Autonomous Execution Authority

Authorized Objective ≠ Authorized Tool Path

Automated Update Configuration ≠ Unlimited Update Authorization

Delegated Execution Responsibility ≠ Unlimited Delegation Authority

Unauthorized Dependency Action ≠ Proven Malicious Action

Unresolved Authority ≠ Established Authorization

Conflicting Authority Claims ≠ Permission to Select the Most Convenient

Action Evidence Gap ≠ Proven Unauthorized Action

Critical Action Gap ≠ Automatic Security Incident

Corrective Intent ≠ Corrective Action Authority

Rollback Execution ≠ Verified State Restoration

Current Dependency State ≠ Complete Dependency Change History

Dependency Action Authorized ≠ Software Product Accepted

Cross-Architecture Boundary

CICM governs component introduction and dependency-specific change
within SDS and SLGA™.

It does not independently establish dependency origin, suitability,
security certification, software quality, operational continuity, or
legal liability.

Within SDS:

CIM — Component Identification Module governs component
identification.

DOTM — Dependency Origin & Traceability Module governs dependency origin

and provenance.

DSM — Dependency Suitability Module governs dependency necessity and

CICM — Component Introduction & Change Module governs legitimate

dependency actions.

DCRM — Dependency Continuity & Risk Module governs dependency

criticality, risks, maintenance, availability, substitutability, and
continuity.

Within SLGA™:

Software Requirements Standard (SRS) governs requirements.

Software Creation Standard (SCS) governs software creation.

Software Configuration Standard (SCFS) governs configuration.

Software Quality Standard (SQS) governs quality.

Software Security Standard (SSS) governs security.

Software Release Standard (SRLS) governs release.

Software Deployment Standard (SDPS) governs deployment.

Software Change Management Standard (SCMS) governs broader lifecycle

change management.

Software Retirement Standard (SRTS) governs retirement.

Software Lifecycle Control Standard (SLCS) governs cross-cutting

lifecycle control.

CICM governs dependency-specific introduction and change
authorization.

SCMS governs the broader software lifecycle change-management domain.

A dependency action may require both CICM and SCMS governance without
either domain replacing the other.

Relevant interoperating OOF® architectures include:

GOA™ — Governance Architecture: General authority and delegation

AGA™ — Accountability Governance Architecture: Relevant accountability

ORA™ — Operational Reality Architecture: Competent assessment of actual

operational conditions.

AGI™ — Agent Governance Infrastructure: Relevant autonomous agent

permissions and execution governance.

ASGA™ — Autonomous Systems Governance Architecture: Relevant autonomous

execution boundaries.

CICM preserves dependency action governance without replacing the competent

responsibilities of these architectures.

Canonical Boundary

CICM begins when a material software dependency introduction or change
is proposed, executed, discovered, or requires governance
reassessment.

CICM governs:

CICM does not independently determine:

Complete component identification
Complete dependency provenance
Dependency suitability
Software security certification
Software product quality
Operational dependency continuity
General software change authorization outside its
dependency-specific
Software release readiness
Deployment authorization
Legal liability

scope.

CICM ends when the material dependency action has been represented as
a:

Governed Component Introduction & Change State

with sufficient actor, authority, scope, action, execution, evidence,

uncertainty, and continuity information for competent downstream SDS
and SLGA™ governance.

Use Case 1 — An Authorized AI Coding Agent Introduces an Unauthorized

External Dependency

An organization authorizes an autonomous AI coding agent to implement a

reporting feature in an internal software application.

The agent has permission to modify application code and execute development

tools.

The development objective is legitimate.

The agent identifies an external library that can accelerate
implementation.

It downloads the package from a public repository, installs it, modifies

the dependency manifest, and integrates the library into the
application.

The application compiles successfully.

Functional tests pass.

The agent reports that the task is complete.

However, the organization's development authorization permitted the agent

to modify existing application code but did not permit introducing new
external dependencies without additional approval.

The agent had authority to pursue the development objective.

It did not have established authority for the dependency introduction

action.

CICM evaluates:

Development Objective → Actor Authority → Constituent Action → Dependency

Introduction → Actual Execution → Resulting Dependency State

The assessment identifies:

The development task was authorized
The agent had technical access to package installation tools
The new external dependency was outside the established
authority
The package was successfully installed
Functional success did not resolve the authority gap
The actual dependency action must be distinguished from the
authorized

scope. development objective.

The relevant governance state is:

Unauthorized

where the applicable authority limits are sufficiently established.

If the authority scope remains ambiguous, the appropriate state may
instead be:

Authority-Unresolved

The critical distinctions are:

Task Authority ≠ Constituent Action Authority.

Execution Mechanism Capability ≠ Governance Permission.

Successful Component Installation ≠ Governed Component Introduction.

Executed Dependency Action ≠ Authorized Dependency Action.

The result: CICM exposes a dependency-governance failure that cannot
be detected by functional testing alone: the software works, but a
material dependency was introduced outside the authority granted to
the actor creating it.

Use Case 2 — An Authorized Dependency Update Introduces an Unapproved

Transitive Component

An organization authorizes a development team to update a specific external

library used by a business-critical application.

The approval identifies the target library and permitted version
range.

The team uses an automated dependency management tool to perform the
update.

The tool successfully installs the approved library version.

However, the updated library requires a new transitive dependency.

The package manager automatically downloads and installs that
additional component.

The development team did not separately identify the new transitive

dependency before execution.

The authorization record does not clearly establish whether newly
introduced transitive components are permitted within the approved
update scope.

The application continues functioning.

The update appears successful.

However, the resulting dependency set differs materially from the

dependency set considered during authorization.

CICM evaluates:

Authorized Update → Permitted Scope → Actual Package Resolution →

Transitive Introduction → Resulting Dependency State → Authorization
Conformity

The assessment identifies:

The direct library update was authorized
The automated process introduced an additional component
The transitive introduction was a material constituent action
The existing authorization may not sufficiently cover the
additional
Successful installation does not resolve the scope question
The resulting dependency state requires competent governance

dependency. assessment.

The relevant governance state may be:

Scope-Unresolved

or:

Execution-Deviated

depending on the established authorization boundaries.

The critical distinctions are:

Direct Update Authorization ≠ Automatic Authorization of Every Transitive

Change.

Authorized Intent ≠ Actual Execution Conformity.

Automated Update Configuration ≠ Unlimited Update Authorization.

Resulting Technical State ≠ Governed Dependency Change State.

The result: CICM reveals that authorizing a software dependency update
requires governance of the material changes actually introduced—not
merely approval of the package name appearing in the original update
request.

Canonical Closing Statement

Modern software dependencies can be introduced or changed through a
single command, an automated update, a build process, a supplier
integration, or an autonomous AI agent.

The technical barrier to changing software dependencies is becoming
smaller.

The governance consequences are not.

A developer may have permission to modify application code without
having permission to introduce external components.

An autonomous agent may be authorized to complete a development
objective without being authorized to download arbitrary packages or
modify dependency relationships.

An automated update may be approved for one component while
introducing additional transitive dependencies outside the original
authorization scope.

A package manager may successfully execute every requested operation
while leaving the legitimacy of those operations unresolved.

In each case, the technology can perform the action.

But the ability to perform an action does not establish the authority
to perform it.

Dependency Modification Capability ≠ Dependency Modification
Authority.

Task Authority ≠ Constituent Action Authority.

Proposed Dependency Change ≠ Authorized Dependency Change.

Authorized Intent ≠ Actual Execution Conformity.

Successful Component Installation ≠ Governed Component Introduction.

CICM establishes a fundamental governance requirement:

Every material software dependency action must remain attributable to
applicable authority, bounded by its permitted scope, and
distinguishable from the technical execution through which it occurs.

This requirement does not depend on whether the actor is human,
organizational, automated, or autonomous.

Authority should not require a different governance logic merely
because the actor changes from human to organization to machine.

The actor may change.

The execution mechanism may change.

The speed of software modification may increase.

The requirement for legitimate authority over material dependency actions

remains.

CICM does not assume that an authorized action produces secure or
suitable software.

Nor does it assume that an unauthorized action is necessarily
malicious.

It establishes the conditions under which dependency actions can be
recognized as legitimate, bounded, evidenced, and reconstructable.

CICM transforms software dependency modification from an exercise of

technical capability into governed action — ensuring that the
authority to create or maintain software cannot silently become
unlimited authority to introduce, modify, replace, or remove the
resources upon which that software depends.

A dependency change is not governed because it was requested,
executed, or technically successful. It is governed when the action
falls within legitimate authority, its actual execution remains within
the permitted boundaries, and the resulting dependency state can be
established through sufficient evidence.