HDIM — Harm Determination Input Module

OOF® Origin Open Foundation®

Independent Methodological Authority

Canonical Definition

The HDIM — Harm Determination Input Module governs how information
required for formal Harm Determination is identified, admitted, qualified,
structured, associated, differentiated, challenged, limited, updated, and
prepared as a governed Determination Input Set.


HDIM establishes the transition:

Governed Harm Recognition State + Governed Harm Boundary +
Determination-Relevant Information → Input Identification → Input
Qualification → Input Structuring → Governed Harm Determination Input Set


Its central question is:

What information is legitimately fit to enter formal Harm Determination,
and under what qualifications, limitations, uncertainty, and provenance?


  • Operational Role


HDS cannot legitimately determine Harm from an uncontrolled collection of:

reports

observations

records

claims

system outputs

measurements

assumptions

or:

opinions

HDIM establishes the governed input layer before Determination Criteria
are applied.


Its operational role is:

to ensure that Harm Determination begins from an explicit, qualified,
traceable, and appropriately bounded input set rather than from whatever
information happens to be available or convenient.


  • Position Within HDS


The HDS internal flow is:

Qualified Inputs → Determination Criteria → Evaluation → Determination
State → Governed Harm Record


The Core Module sequence is:

HDIM → HDCM-D → HDEM → HDSM → HDRM

HDIM receives:

Governed Harm Recognition State

and:

Governed Harm Boundary

It produces:

Governed Harm Determination Input Set

for HDCM-D.

  • Governed Object


The primary governed object is:

Harm Determination Input

Possible input states include:

Candidate Input

Admitted Input

Qualified Input

Qualified with Limitations

Corroborative Input

Contradictory Input

Duplicate Input

Superseded Input

Disputed Input

Pending Qualification

Excluded Input

Each material input must retain its governance state.

  • Foundational Input Principle


The foundational distinction is:

Available Information ≠ Qualified Determination Input

Information does not become suitable for Harm Determination merely because
it:


exists

has been reported

appears in a system

comes from an authority

supports a preferred conclusion

or:

is easy to access

  • Input Identification


HDIM identifies information materially relevant to determining the bounded
Harm.


Potential inputs may include:

Recognition outputs

Harm Boundary outputs

subject information

temporal information

effect information

downstream information

operational records

observations

measurements

subject reports

system records

machine detections

expert findings

validated findings

historical information

contradictory information

Identification means the information should be considered.

It does not mean it should automatically be relied upon.

  • Recognition Inputs


HRS provides the:

Governed Harm Recognition State

HDIM preserves the Recognition basis relevant to Determination.

However:

Recognized Harm ≠ Determined Harm

Recognition information is an input to Determination, not its conclusion.

  • Boundary Inputs


HBS provides the:

Governed Harm Boundary

including relevant:

subject

temporal

effect

and:

downstream

dimensions.

HDIM must preserve the boundary against which Harm is being determined.

Canonical principle:

Determination Inputs must correspond to the Harm object being determined.

  • Input Relevance


An input must have a materially supportable relationship to the
Determination question.


Information may be:

directly relevant

indirectly relevant

contextually relevant

corroborative

contradictory

or:

irrelevant

Volume alone does not create relevance.

  • Input Fitness


A relevant input may still be unfit for a particular Determination
purpose.


Fitness may depend on:

scope

method

timing

subject applicability

domain applicability

measurement conditions

source limitations

validation state

or:

integrity state

Therefore:

Relevant Input ≠ Fit Input by Default

  • Source Qualification


HDIM must preserve what kind of source produced the input.

Examples include:

affected subject

witness

operator

organization

sensor

AI system

autonomous system

technical record

expert

authority

external institution

Source type may affect qualification.

It must not predetermine truth.

  • Authority Status ≠ Input Truth


An input must not become methodologically privileged solely because it
originates from an institution or authority.


Therefore:

Authoritative Source ≠ Automatically Correct Input

Likewise:

Non-Authoritative Source ≠ Automatically Invalid Input

  • Subject-Reported Inputs


A harmed or potentially harmed subject may provide important information
about:


effects

timing

experience

function

persistence

or:

change

Subject reports must remain governable without either automatic acceptance
or automatic dismissal.


Canonical distinction:

Subject Report ≠ Harm Determination

  • Machine-Generated Inputs


Inputs may be generated through:

sensors

monitoring systems

AI models

automated detection

logs

analytics

or:

autonomous systems

Machine generation does not automatically establish accuracy.

Therefore:

Machine Output ≠ Qualified Determination Input by Default

  • Human-Generated Inputs


Human observations, evaluations, testimony, and expert conclusions may
contain:


error

bias

uncertainty

incomplete perception

interpretation

or:

conflict

Human origin does not automatically establish reliability.

  • Direct and Indirect Inputs


Determination may rely on both:

Direct Inputs

and:

Indirect Inputs

An indirect input must not be excluded merely because an intermediate
relationship exists.


Canonical distinction:

Indirect Input ≠ Irrelevant Input

Its relationship must instead be represented.

  • Historical Inputs


Harm may be determined retrospectively.

Historical inputs may therefore include:

archived records

earlier measurements

past reports

historical system states

later-discovered evidence

reconstructed timelines

Historical age does not automatically eliminate relevance.

  • Late-Discovered Information


Information may become available after:

Recognition

boundary establishment

initial evaluation

or:

earlier Determination

HDIM must support admission of new information without rewriting the
history of what was previously known.


Canonical principle:

Late Discovery ≠ Late Harm

  • Temporal Applicability


Every materially time-dependent input should be associated with the period
to which it legitimately applies.


An input generated at T3 may describe:

T1

T2

T3

or:

a range

The timestamp of the record must not automatically become the timestamp of
the Harm condition described.


Therefore:

Record Time ≠ Harm Time by Default

  • Subject Applicability


An input concerning Subject A must not automatically be generalized to:

Subject B

a group

an organization

or:

a population

without sufficient basis.

Therefore:

One Subject Input ≠ Universal Subject Input

  • Domain Applicability


Information valid in one Harm domain may not automatically establish
another.


For example:

operational degradation

may inform but not automatically establish:

medical Harm

or:

financial Harm

Cross-domain use must remain qualified.

  • Scope Qualification


Every material input should have an understood scope.

Scope may include:

subject

time

effect

system

location

domain

operation

downstream relationship

An input must not support a conclusion broader than its legitimate scope.

Canonical principle:

Input Scope Must Bound Input Use

  • Input Provenance


Material Determination inputs should preserve sufficient provenance to
understand:


where the input originated

how it was produced

when it was produced

what transformation occurred

which system or actor produced it

and:

whether its origin remains known

OBIDENITY® may govern relevant identity and provenance structures.

HDIM uses those structures for Harm Determination input governance.

  • Transformed Inputs


Information may be:

summarized

aggregated

translated

normalized

filtered

inferred

converted

or:

AI-processed

Transformation may change what the information can legitimately support.

Canonical principle:

Validated Source ≠ Validated Derivative

A transformed input must preserve its transformation history where
material.


  • Derived Inputs


A Derived Input is produced from one or more other inputs.

Conceptually:

Input A + Input B → Derived Input C

The derived input must preserve:

source relationships

derivation method

assumptions

limitations

and:

uncertainty

  • Aggregated Inputs


Several inputs may be combined.

Aggregation can reveal patterns invisible at the individual-input level.

But:

Aggregation ≠ Automatic Sufficiency

The quality of the aggregate depends on the structure and legitimacy of
the contributing inputs.


  • Composite Determination Inputs


Some Harm can only be represented through multiple individually incomplete
inputs.


Conceptually:

Input A + Input B + Input C → Composite Determination Basis

HDIM must preserve such inputs so HDEM can later evaluate them
collectively.


Canonical principle:

Individual Input Insufficiency ≠ Composite Input Insufficiency

  • Distributed Inputs


Determination information may be distributed across:

subjects

agents

systems

organizations

sessions

locations

domains

and:

time periods

Technical fragmentation must not make the complete input basis invisible.

  • Evidence Fragmentation


Canonical principle:

Evidence fragmentation must not make a composite operation unauditable or
a materially coherent Harm undeterminable by default.


HDIM must therefore support cross-source association while preserving
provenance.


  • Local Input ≠ Complete Reality


A single system may contain only one part of the relevant information.

Therefore:

Local Input Set ≠ Complete Determination Input Set by Default

This is particularly important for distributed AI and autonomous systems.

  • Supporting Inputs


A Supporting Input materially supports one or more propositions relevant
to Harm Determination.


Its support must be represented without converting it directly into the
conclusion.


Therefore:

Supporting Input ≠ Determination Conclusion

  • Contradictory Inputs


HDIM must actively preserve information that materially conflicts with the
emerging Determination basis.


Contradictory information must not be excluded merely because it makes
Determination more difficult.


Canonical principle:

Contradiction is a governance input, not a data-cleaning inconvenience.

  • Counterevidence


Counterevidence materially supports a conclusion inconsistent with another
Determination proposition.


HDIM must preserve:

what it contradicts

its scope

its qualification

its provenance

and:

its limitations

HDEM later evaluates its significance.

  • Missing Inputs


HDIM should identify materially expected information that is unavailable.

Possible states include:

Missing

Unavailable

Not Collected

Destroyed

Unknown Whether Existing

Inaccessible

These states must remain distinct where material.

  • Missing Information ≠ Negative Evidence


Canonical distinction:

Missing Input ≠ Evidence That the Opposite Is True

Missing information may affect Determination sufficiency.

It does not automatically determine the conclusion.

  • Evidence Absence vs Evidence of Absence


HDIM must distinguish:

Absence of Evidence

from:

Evidence of Absence

This distinction is essential for later HDS evaluation.

  • Input Uncertainty


Every material input may carry uncertainty concerning:

accuracy

scope

timing

identity

interpretation

measurement

completeness

or:

relationship

Uncertainty should be represented rather than hidden.

  • Input Confidence


Where appropriate, HDIM may associate confidence with an input.

Possible states may include:

High

Moderate

Low

Unknown

Disputed

Confidence must remain tied to the specific input dimension being
assessed.


  • Confidence ≠ Truth


Canonical distinction:

High Confidence ≠ Guaranteed Truth

and:

Low Confidence ≠ False Information

Confidence informs governance.

It does not replace evaluation.

  • Input Limitations


Material limitations should travel with the input.

Examples include:

partial observation

limited sample

measurement range

missing context

uncertain identity

temporal gap

model limitation

transformation loss

source dependency

An input stripped of material limitations may become misleading.

  • Duplicate Inputs


The same underlying information may appear in several records.

HDIM must distinguish:

independent corroboration

from:

duplicated representation

Canonical principle:

Signal Replication ≠ Independent Corroboration

  • Corroboration


Independent inputs may strengthen the Determination basis where they
materially support the same proposition through sufficiently independent
pathways.


Corroboration must preserve:

independence

scope

relationship

and:

limitations

  • Source Dependence


Two apparently independent sources may derive from the same underlying
information.


Conceptually:

Source A → Report B

Source A → System C → Report D

B and D may not constitute independent corroboration.

HDIM must preserve material source dependence.

  • Input Conflict


Inputs may conflict regarding:

whether Harm occurred

when it occurred

who was affected

what effect existed

how long it persisted

whether a downstream consequence belongs

HDIM records the conflict.

It does not resolve the final Determination.

  • Input Exclusion


An input may be excluded from the Determination Input Set where it is:

irrelevant

materially unfit

outside scope

duplicative without independent value

unusable

or:

methodologically incompatible with the determination purpose

Exclusion must be documented.

  • Excluded Input ≠ Deleted Input


Canonical principle:

Exclusion From Determination ≠ Erasure From Governance History

Where material, the existence of the excluded input and the reason for
exclusion should remain traceable.


  • Input Bias


HDIM must protect against input selection driven by:

desired conclusion

organizational interest

financial exposure

reputational concern

legal strategy

technical convenience

or:

availability bias

Canonical principle:

Input selection must follow the Determination question, not the preferred
Determination outcome.


  • Confirmation Bias


A Determination process must not collect only information supporting the
initial Recognition state.


Recognition creates a governance object.

It does not predetermine Determination.

Therefore:

Recognized Harm ≠ Presumed Determined Harm

  • Visibility Bias


Highly visible information must not automatically receive disproportionate
weight merely because it is easy to observe.


Likewise:

Invisible Information ≠ Irrelevant Information

  • Authority Bias


Information from powerful or formal institutions must not automatically
override materially stronger contradictory inputs.


HDS requires methodological qualification, not institutional hierarchy
alone.


  • AI-Generated Summaries


An AI-generated summary may support Determination workflows.

But the summary may:

omit information

compress uncertainty

merge sources

lose provenance

introduce inference

Therefore:

AI Summary ≠ Original Determination Basis

Where materially relied upon, source traceability must remain available.

  • Synthetic and Simulated Inputs


Simulated information may support understanding, testing, or comparison.

But:

Simulated Evidence ≠ Actual Harm Evidence

SIMULOS® governs simulation.

HDIM must clearly classify simulated inputs so they cannot silently become
evidence of actual Harm.


  • Predicted Inputs


Predictions may identify future or likely consequences.

But:

Predicted Harm ≠ Existing Harm Input by Default

Prediction must remain distinct from information about actual Harm.

  • Operational Reality Inputs


ORA™ may provide information about:

actual execution

system state

operational sequence

failure

constraint

intervention

HDIM may admit these as Determination inputs where relevant.

But:

Operational Reality ≠ Harm Determination

  • Evidence Governance Boundary


ADIT® governs:

evidence formation

integrity

correlation

verification

audit

HDIM does not recreate those functions.

It asks:

Is this evidence fit to enter this Harm Determination, and under what
qualification?


  • Validation Boundary


VALIDOS™ may establish whether information has been validated for a
particular purpose.


HDIM must preserve the validation state where materially relevant.

But:

Validated Input ≠ Sufficient Harm Determination Basis

Validation establishes input fitness or validity.

HDS establishes Harm.

  • Integrity Boundary


INTEGROS® may establish relevant integrity states.

HDIM may use those states in qualification.

But:

Integrity State ≠ Determination Input Conclusion

  • Identity Boundary


OBIDENITY® may govern:

origin

identity

ownership

provenance

continuity

HDIM uses those outputs where necessary.

It does not independently establish identity.

  • Input Change


An input may later be:

corrected

superseded

invalidated

expanded

reinterpreted

or:

withdrawn

HDIM must update its current governance state without erasing previous
states.


  • Input Reassessment


Input qualification must be reassessed where:

new provenance appears

validation changes

integrity concerns arise

scope changes

the Harm Boundary changes

a source is corrected

a transformation is discovered

new contradictory information appears

  • Historical Input Integrity


HDIM must preserve:

Input State₁ → New Information → Input State₂

including:

original input

original qualification

limitations

change

new qualification

reason

Canonical principle:

Current Input State ≠ Complete Input History

  • Determination Input Set Completeness


HDIM should assess whether the available input set sufficiently covers the
dimensions required for the next Determination stage.


Completeness does not require all imaginable information.

It requires sufficient coverage to apply the relevant Determination
Criteria meaningfully.


  • Complete Input Set ≠ Sufficient Determination


Even a complete input set may fail to establish Harm.

Therefore:

Input Completeness ≠ Determination Sufficiency

HDEM later evaluates sufficiency.

  • Determination Readiness


HDIM may conclude that the input layer is:

Ready

Ready with Limitations

Conditionally Ready

or:

Not Ready

for criteria application and evaluation.

Readiness concerns the input layer.

It does not determine Harm.

  • Handoff to HDCM-D


HDIM produces:

Governed Harm Determination Input Set

HDCM-D then asks:

Against what explicit criteria must these qualified inputs be evaluated to
determine Harm?


The separation is essential:

Input Qualification ≠ Determination Criteria

and:

Input Qualification ≠ Determination Evaluation

  • Minimum Implementation Framework


A minimum HDIM implementation requires eight capabilities.

  • Input Identification


Identify materially relevant Recognition, Boundary, subject, temporal,
effect, downstream, operational, evidentiary, historical, supporting, and
contradictory information.


  • Input Qualification


Represent relevance, fitness, scope, provenance, temporal applicability,
subject applicability, uncertainty, confidence, and limitations.


  • Provenance & Transformation Governance


Preserve source, derivation, transformation, aggregation, and dependency
relationships where materially relevant.


  • Composite & Distributed Input Governance


Support inputs distributed across subjects, systems, agents, sessions,
organizations, domains, locations, and time without losing their
collective structure.


  • Conflict, Missing Information & Duplication Governance


Represent contradictory inputs, counterevidence, missing information,
evidence absence, duplicate records, and independent corroboration
distinctly.


  • Input Bias Controls


Prevent preferred outcomes, visibility, authority status, reporting
convenience, organizational interests, or technical availability from
determining the admitted input set.


  • Reassessment & Historical Continuity


Support correction, supersession, invalidation, withdrawal,
requalification, and historical preservation.


  • Governed Output


Produce a traceable Governed Harm Determination Input Set with explicit
readiness status for the next HDS stage.


A system that simply collects available information and passes it directly
into a Harm conclusion does not fully implement HDIM.


  • Use Case 1 — Conflicting Human, Operational, and System
    Information


A subject reports persistent Harm.

An operational record supports part of the reported timeline.

A system record appears to contradict another part.

Additional historical information is incomplete.

HDIM does not decide which conclusion is correct.

It qualifies:

the subject report

the operational record

the contradictory system record

the missing historical information

and:

their respective scope, provenance, uncertainty, and limitations

The resulting Governed Harm Determination Input Set allows HDS to evaluate
the complete basis without silently removing inconvenient information.


The governing principle is:

Contradiction must be governed before it can be evaluated.

  • Use Case 2 — Distributed AI Harm Produces Fragmented
    Determination


Inputs

A Harm-relevant AI operation spans:

Agent A

Model B

Tool C

External System D

and:

a physical execution environment

Each system contains only part of the relevant operational record.

No local record independently represents the complete Harm-producing
operation.


HDIM reconstructs the Determination Input Set across those partitions
while preserving:


source identity

execution relationships

transformations

time

limitations

duplicate information

and:

material gaps

The governing principle is:

Fragmented information must not make a materially coherent Harm invisible
to Determination.


  • Governance Requirements


HDIM requires that:

  • available information remain distinct from qualified
    Determination


input; - Recognition and Boundary outputs remain preserved as governed
inputs; - relevance remain distinct from fitness; - source authority not
determine truth; - subject reports and machine outputs not automatically
determine Harm; - direct and indirect inputs remain governable; -
late-discovered information not redefine Harm timing by default; - record
time remain distinct from Harm time; - input scope constrain legitimate
input use; - provenance and material transformations remain traceable; -
derived and aggregated inputs preserve source relationships; - composite
and distributed inputs remain governable; - supporting and contradictory
information both remain visible; - missing information remain distinct
from negative evidence; - absence of evidence remain distinct from
evidence of absence; - uncertainty and limitations travel with material
inputs; - confidence remain distinct from truth; - duplicate
representation remain distinct from independent corroboration; - excluded
inputs remain historically traceable where material; - input selection
remain protected from outcome bias; - simulated and predicted information
remain distinct from evidence of actual Harm; - ADIT®, VALIDOS™,
INTEGROS®, OBIDENITY®, ORA™, and SIMULOS® boundaries remain preserved; -
input changes and reassessment preserve historical integrity; -
Determination readiness remain distinct from Determination itself.


  • Governance Logic


HDIM applies the following logic:

Has HRS produced a governed Recognition state and HBS established the Harm
Boundary?


If no:

→ formal Determination Input governance is not ready.

If yes:

→ identify Determination-relevant information.

Is the information relevant to the bounded Harm?

If no:

→ exclude it from the Determination Input Set while preserving the reason
where material.


If yes:

→ assess fitness.

Is the input fit for its intended Determination use?

If yes:

→ qualify it.

If partly:

→ qualify it with limitations.

If unresolved:

→ maintain Pending Qualification.

Does the input conflict with other information?

→ preserve the conflict.

Is the information duplicated?

→ distinguish duplication from independent corroboration.

Is provenance or transformation materially relevant?

→ preserve it.

Is information missing?

→ identify the missing state without converting absence into negative
evidence.


Are several individually incomplete inputs collectively relevant?

→ preserve their composite relationship.

Does the available input set sufficiently support criteria application?

If yes:

→ establish Ready or Ready with Limitations.

If no:

→ establish Not Ready or Conditional Readiness.

Then produce:

Governed Harm Determination Input Set

for HDCM-D.

At every stage:

Information ≠ Qualified Input

Recognition ≠ Determination

Relevance ≠ Fitness

Authority ≠ Truth

Duplication ≠ Corroboration

Missing Information ≠ Negative Evidence

Input Completeness ≠ Determination Sufficiency

  • Governance Outputs


HDIM may produce:

  • Governed Harm Determination Input Set
  • Candidate Input Set
  • Qualified Input
  • Qualified Input with Limitations
  • Excluded Input
  • Pending Qualification State
  • Supporting Input
  • Contradictory Input
  • Counterevidence State
  • Input Relevance State
  • Input Fitness State
  • Input Scope
  • Input Provenance Record
  • Input Transformation Record
  • Derived Input Record
  • Composite Input Structure
  • Distributed Input Structure
  • Missing Input State
  • Input Uncertainty State
  • Input Confidence State
  • Input Limitation Record
  • Duplicate Input State
  • Corroboration Relationship
  • Source Dependency Record
  • Input Conflict State
  • Input Reassessment Record
  • Historical Input Record
  • Determination Input Readiness State


The principal output is:

Governed Harm Determination Input Set

  • Critical Distinctions


Available Information ≠ Qualified Determination Input

Recognized Harm ≠ Determined Harm

Relevant Input ≠ Fit Input

Authoritative Source ≠ Automatically Correct Input

Subject Report ≠ Harm Determination

Machine Output ≠ Qualified Determination Input by Default

Indirect Input ≠ Irrelevant Input

Late Discovery ≠ Late Harm

Record Time ≠ Harm Time

One Subject Input ≠ Universal Subject Input

Input Scope Must Bound Input Use

Validated Source ≠ Validated Derivative

Aggregation ≠ Automatic Sufficiency

Individual Input Insufficiency ≠ Composite Input Insufficiency

Local Input Set ≠ Complete Determination Input Set

Supporting Input ≠ Determination Conclusion

Missing Input ≠ Evidence That the Opposite Is True

Absence of Evidence ≠ Evidence of Absence

High Confidence ≠ Guaranteed Truth

Low Confidence ≠ False Information

Signal Replication ≠ Independent Corroboration

Excluded Input ≠ Deleted Input

Recognized Harm ≠ Presumed Determined Harm

AI Summary ≠ Original Determination Basis

Simulated Evidence ≠ Actual Harm Evidence

Predicted Harm ≠ Existing Harm Input by Default

Operational Reality ≠ Harm Determination

Validated Input ≠ Sufficient Harm Determination Basis

Input Completeness ≠ Determination Sufficiency

Input Qualification ≠ Determination Criteria

Input Qualification ≠ Determination Evaluation

  • Canonical Boundary


The HDIM — Harm Determination Input Module governs the identification,
admission, qualification, structuring, provenance, transformation, scope,
fitness, uncertainty, limitations, conflict, contradiction, missing
information, duplication, corroboration, composite relationships,
distributed information, reassessment, and historical continuity of
information used for formal Harm Determination. It produces the Governed
Harm Determination Input Set but does not establish Determination
Criteria, evaluate whether the criteria are satisfied, determine the Harm
Determination State, create the final Governed Harm Record, establish
general causation, assign accountability or liability, or replace
evidence, validation, integrity, identity, operational reality, AI
behavior, autonomous execution, simulation, Value, prediction, or
jurisdiction-specific governance.


  • Canonical Closing Statement


Harm Determination is only as legitimate as the governed basis from which
it begins.


Information must not become evidence merely because it is available,
become reliable merely because it is authoritative, or disappear merely
because it contradicts the expected conclusion.


HDIM ensures that Determination begins with a qualified representation of
what is known, what is uncertain, what conflicts, what is missing, and
where each material input came from.


Before Harm can be determined, the information used to determine it must
itself become governable.